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A REJOINDER TO MR. FERBER

upon whether law professors have a duty to attempt to bring about
what Professor Manne refers to as "moral escalation". I do think that
in the securities market this is precisely what Congress formed the
Securities and Exchange Commission to attempt to bring about.

A Rejoinder To Mr.Ferber
By Henry G. Manne
A fundamental difference between my approach to this problem and
Mr. Ferber's is shown by his intimation that for him and the SEC
Congress ordains what is moral and what is not. That, however, is not
the appropriate posture for scholars seeking objective resolution of a
complex issue. I for one am not willing to have Congress decree my
attitudes on what is moral. But frankly I find unconvincing Mr. Ferber's
suggestion that notions of morality and honesty as indicated by
Congress have had anything to do with the development of Rule lOb-5.
After all that is the same Congress that refused to adopt an express
provision outlawing all insider trading.
No one questions that Congress wanted securities markets honestly
conducted when they adopted the federal securities laws. But that hardly
explains the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Congress certainly did not say to an unknown commission "Here i 'the
word." Go forth and do good!" What Congress indicated was that this
area was too complicated and too dynamic for specific legislation on
every issue that might arise. Therefore they created a commission which,
through its staff of experts, was supposed to learn and then do what was
in the interest of the public.
Furthermore I should surmise-and I would be very curious to
know whether the Commissioners themselves agree with Mr. Ferber or
me on this-that most of Congress wanted the securities markets of the
country regulated in the economic interest of the public. Indeed one
could say that there is a moral obligation on the SEC to know that its
regulations are not causing more harm than good to the public's
financial interests.
And yet, we find the Solicitor of the SEC making the almost
unbelievable statement that "economic effect is largely irrelevant." This
is a terrible confession that the SEC and spokesmen for it do not
comprehend the significance of what they are doing nor do they
personally concern themselves about the impact of their regulation on
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millions of investors who do indeed think that they are receiving
economic, not moral, benefits from the agency. No congressman would

tell his constituents, "you may be losing money by SEC regulation, but
that is irrelevant, since the men down there are serving a higher moral
order."
The truth of the matter is that there need be no conflict between
good economics and good morality. The confusion arises when the
attempt is made to substitute superficial ideas of morality for
fundamental economic doctrine. Clearly every decision has an economic
impact just as it has moral implications. But how can one judge the
moral content or desirability of an act of economic regulation without
knowing the effects of it?
But this is all a charade, or some form of high comedy. The SEC
does not consult theologians or philosophers in its policy making any
more than it consults economists. The Commission plays a serious game
of law and politics, though the real winners are not always announced.
Securities regulation has probably been of greatest economic benefit to
members of the securities industry and to the lawyers who practice in
and before the SEC. The rest of the country, whose influence is not so
easily felt, have to accept disingenuous palaver about the morality of
government and the irrelevance of their own wealth position.
I shall comment on a few of Mr. Ferber's more egregious errors. In
my article I never credited the SEC with making the argument that
information is the property of shareholders. I addressed myself only to
the academic critics of my book. As a matter of fact the SEC itself has
said so little about the policy underlying their interpretation of Rule lOb5 that they have never given me much to respond to. Of course that way
they are free to dissociate themselves from positions of their supporters
as they see fit.
Mr. Ferber finds "a natural tendency for insiders to prolong the
period prior to disclosure" if insider trading is allowed. This statement is
certainly contrary to the economic analysis and studies made on the
same subject.
Mr. Ferber simply does not understand my discussion of the
economics of partial enforcement of certain kinds of laws. The reason
that prostitution, marijuana, pornography and insider trading are of one
kind is because an organized market in the illicit goods will develop. But
that is not true generally of fraud, murder or many other forms of crimes
against which enforcement is also only partial. As illicit businesses
organize, grow, and prosper, so does the danger of their corrupting
government officials.
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Mr. Ferber is absolutely correct when he says there are potential
conflicts of interest from insider trading by a trustee of a corporation in
reorganization. Since he did not read my book, however, he could not
know that I made precisely and exactly that point. But Mr. Ferber goes
on to say that the same possible conflict "may exist to some extent
whenever there is trading by corporate officials." Unfortunately he does
not supply us with the minor premise in this syllogism, the one equating
all companies with insolvent ones. And, unfortunately for his logic, the
position of trustees in reorganization is vastly different from that of
corporate officials generally. His suggestion that this analogy explains
the Commission's position in Texas Gulf will certainly come as a
surprise to many people.
Lawyers interested in anticipating new directions by the SEC
should notice what may be the most important single sentence in Mr.
Ferber's reply. He states that "the Commission has objected [to insider
trading] only where the person taking advantage of information owes a
duty of loyalty to the person he is trading with and is breaching that duty
or where some type of aiding and abetting in such a breach of trust
occurs." This sentence sounds suspiciously more like Cady, Roberts
than it does like Texas Gulf. It is difficult to conclude that the
Commission in Texas Gulf was saying that the defendants had some
special duty of loyalty to the individuals with whom they were trading,
though that is perfectly consistent with the standards stated in the Cady,
Roberts opinion. Does this represent backtracking by the SEC on the
frighteningly broad holding of Texas Gulp Does this statement mean
that "tippees" are excluded from liability under Rule lOb-5, or are they
aiders and abettors? What are the standards for establishing whether a
duty of loyalty is owed? Or is this statement merely another questionbegging explanation of why we have a rule against insider trading?
Many readers will be somewhat confused by the juxtaposition of the
paragraph on accounting procedures in the midst of a discussion of
insider trading. I do not understand that either, though I think I know
what he is unhappy about. Mr. Ferber is actually complaining because in
another article (Manne, Accounting and Administrative Law Aspects of
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. 15 N.Y.L.F. 304 (1969)) I had not
praised the Commission for what I consider a grotesque example of
regulatory misbehavior. The reference is to the case of Gerstle v. GambleSkogmo. I hope that my readers will realize that in that case the SEC
took an amicus position flatly contrary to a stern warning they earlier
gave the defendants on the same point. Thus, in a civil suit for damages,
which could go as high as five million dollars, the SEC announced its
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new approach for this case. The accounting rule in question dealt with
evaluations of appreciated assets, and I can only say that it took a long
time for the SEC, in Mr. Ferber's words, to "learn from its experience."
The old rule had been (and may still be) blindly followed by the SEC
almost from its inception, despite widespread criticism. They certainly
picked an odd place, time, and way to display their new found learning. I
find it incredible that Mr. Ferber would even mention so shameful a
travesty on justice and morality as the SEC perpetrated in the Gerstle
litigation. But I am glad he mentioned the case, and I strongly
recommend an examination of the SEC behavior therein to anyone
interested in morals in government.
If I understand it correctly, Mr. Ferber's footnote number 21 says
that no private interest groups have gained strong influence with the
Commission in its thirty-six years. How about the New York Stock
Exchange as opposed to small regionals, Mr. Ferber, or the larger
member firms of the New York Stock Exchange, or the NASD, or old
line mutual funds, or entrenched corporate managers who pushed for the
Williams Bill? This sounds like a claim that bootleggers had no influence
with the Chicago police during prohibition, or that the railroads were
never closer than a counsel's arm's length to the ICC.
Only one last point needs to be clarified. Did Professor Schotland
know what he was talking about or not when he claimed that the SEC
traced all New York City trades in Texas Gulf stock based on
information originating in Washington, D.C.? Obviously if he meant no
more than that a few Washingtonians were asked whom they had
contacted in New York, he did not say anything of significance, and the
SEC stands accused, as I stated in my main atticle, of not discovering all
the insider trading it claims to detect-or of hiding what it knew. On the
contrary, if Schotland was correct, then the SEC should tell exactly how
they do get the information. I-have not accused the SEC of wiretapping.
I have said that information which Schotland claims to have gotten from
the Commission strongly suggests government investigation into records
probably better kept private. This raises a serious civil liberties question
and it should not be shrugged off, obfuscated, or denied without
explanation. Mr. Ferber's comments are too unresponsive to be
significant or satisfying. And someone in the Commission should
certainly explain carefully what procedures the Commission uses in its
policing activities. There is no reason that SEC policemen should be
freer of public surveillance than any other police force.

